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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Coeur d'Alene Police Officers arrested Henry Martyn Hall on May 28, 2014, and placed him 
in the custody of the Kootenai County Sheriff. Mr. Hall would spend the next two hundred and five 
(205) days in administrative segregation of one type or another, consisting of a small padded room 
with no windows. For months he was denied any reprieve from his cell and kept naked safe for a 
smock. During much of this time Mr. Hall was on suicide watch due to various actions he took, 
including at one point cutting open his wrist with an unknown object, and then later reopening the 
wound and rubbing feces in it, and then refusing medical assistance to prevent infection. For a few 
short weeks in October he would be taken to the Kootenai Medical Center to be treated for his 
various mental illnesses. 
Mr. Hall pied guilty to burglary on November 11, 2014, but maintained his innocence 
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). In exchange, the state dismissed a grand 
theft charge and a carrying a concealed weapon without a permit charge, and agreed to recommend 
no more than a five year unified sentence consisting of three years fixed and two indeterminate. 
At sentencing, Mr. Hall had filed a Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing and Motion to 
Commute Sentence. He requested that the Court give him a change at a retained jurisdiction or 
impose a two year sentence. He argued that the sentence should be shortened in light of the months 
he spent in solitary confinement without proper care. The District Court found that his treatment 
prior to sentencing was not relevant to his sentence, and imposed a five year unified sentence as 
requested by the state. Mr. Hall timely appealed from the sentence. 
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Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts 
Martyn Hall was born Seattle, WA, on Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter "PSI") p. 1. He spent the first four years of his life being sexually, physically, 
and mentally abused by his mother's first husband. PSI p. 15. When he was four years old, she left 
him at his grandparents and disappeared for four years. Id. When she returned, Mr. Hall used 
marijuana for the first time at the age of eight. PSI p. 15, 20. He would remain with her and her 
abusive husband for six months before returning to his grandparents. Id. Academically, Mr. Hall had 
trouble in school due to his mental illness. PSI p. 15. Mr. Hall committed his first crime at the age of 
thirteen, and by fifteen he would be placed in the custody of the state and sent to a mental hospital. 
PSI p. 8, Tr. p. 41, L. 6-14. After that he would go into foster care but be placed with his 
grandfather. Tr. p. 41, L. 15-19. As a child, Mr. Hall recalls being diagnosed with depression, 
anxiety, bi-polar disorder, ADD, ADHD, and abandonment issues. PSI p. 15. He was passed back 
and forth between various caregivers and encountered drug abuse among his family members. Id. 
For the next several years, Mr. Hall spent time in Montana, Indiana, and Idaho. PSI p. 9-11; 
Tr. p. 41, L. 25, p. 42, L. 1-25. Much of this time was spent in custody. Id. In or around November 
23, 2002, Mr. Hall was arrested for Burglary in Idaho with a pending Burglary case in Montana. PSI 
p. 12; Tr. p. 42-44. Mr. Hall would spend the next ten years in prison in Idaho. Tr. p. 44, L. 14-23. 
During his time in prison, he would be diagnosed with various mental illnesses and be given various 
medications. Tr. p. 46, L. 2-25, p. 47, L. 1-20. Upon his release from prison in July of 2013, he 
reports that he was given no reintegration services and his medications simply stopped. Tr. p. 44, L. 
24-25, p. 45, L. 1-4. During the next few months, Mr. Hall would be charged with drug related 
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offenses in Washington and Idaho. 12-13. 
May 28, 2014, Coeur officers arrested and booked Mr. Hall into the Kootenai 
County Public Safety Building (hereinafter "the jail"). PSI p. 6. The jail was unable to provide Mr. 
Hall with a mental health evaluation or medication, beyond social workers from ACES Community 
Services finding he was a danger to himself and placing him in medical observation. See 
Defendant's Motion for Payment of Costs of Mental Health Evaluations Out of District Court Fund 
(hereinafter "Motion for Mental Health Evaluation", p. 2 (filed under seal on July 30, 2014); Keith 
Cousins, Mental Illness Services Limited, COEURD' ALENE PRESS (Aug. 10, 2014); Tr. p. 61, L 2-17. 
Due to suicidal ideation and behavioral issues, Mr. Hall was placed in administrative 
segregation, in safety cells, holding cells, and "medical observation cell," meaning a ten-foot by 
twelve-foot holding cell with no open windows, and padded walls. See Jail Bureau Policy & 
Procedure Manual, Kootenai County, Vol. III, 45-52, 62-63 (2008) (hereinafter "Manual"); Response 
to Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, Watch Commander Log entries for June 7, 28, 2014, July 
11, 2014, August 2, 17, 19, 2014, September 4, 19, 2014, October 6, 2014, November 4, 5, 6, 7, 26, 
2014, December 8, 10, 2014 (hereinafter "Log") (filed December 15, 2014); Tr. p. 27, L 10-19; p. 
63, L 12-23, p. 70, L 18-19, p. 71, L 1-8. He was only allowed a smock and sandals to wear. See 
id. At times, Mr. Hall was placed in restraints involving a belly chain, safety mittens, and a Restraint 
Chair. Log entry for August, 1, 2014. 
On or about July 21, 2014, based on the request of defense counsel and the reports of ACES, 
the state moved for Mr. Hall's commitment. Motion for Mental Health Evaluation, p. 2. On July 23, 
2014, Mr. Hall was found mentally ill and a danger to himself, but in violation of LC.§ 66-329(5) he 
was returned to the jail. Id. On July 26, 2014, Mr. Hall opened his wrist by an unknown method and 
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was to the Medical Center for stitches, and then returned to the stripped cell in 
On July 28, 2014, the state moved to dismiss petition for lack of a second designated 
examination, in violation of the Magistrate's orders. Id; see, also, Tr. p. 30, L. 1-14; p. 62, L. 1-20. 
On August 5, 2014, the District Court ordered payment for a mental health evaluation out of 
the District Court fund. Order for Payment of Costs of Mental Health Evaluation Out of District 
Court Fund (filed under seal). On August 28, 2014, that evaluation was completed and Mr. Hall was 
diagnosed with, among other things, Major depressive affective disorder and a Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder, and prescribed medications. Mental Health Records (filed under seal on August 28, 2014 ); 
Emergency Motion for Appointment of Designated Examiner (filed September 22, 2014). 
Eventually on October 3, 2014, Mr. Hall was committed to the Department of Health and 
Welfare for mental health care. PSI, p. 19; Tr. p. 30, L 1-16. On October 16, 2014, that commitment 
was terminated and he was returned, now on a different set of medications, to the jail. Id. 
On November 11, 2014, Mr. Hall entered an Alford plea to burglary. Tr. p. 17-23. Mr. Hall 
accepted that a jury might find he had entered the home of strangers at roughly four o'clock in the 
morning to steal. Tr. p. 20-23. Mr. Hall attempted to go to sentencing but due to the complexity of 
his case and the fact that the victims had not been notified, sentencing was set out one month and a 
presentence investigation ordered. Tr. p. 33-35. 
Prior to sentencing Mr. Hall filed Materials in Aid of Sentencing and a Memorandum in Aid 
of Sentencing and Motion to Commute Sentence. The state filed a Response to Defendant's 
Sentencing Memorandum. On December 19, 2014, the District Court heard from the parties as to 
Mr. Hall's sentence. The Court eventually held that in weighing Mr. Hall's crime with his character, 
taking into account his mental illness, it would impose a five year unified sentence consisting of 
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three years fixed and two indeterminate. Tr. p. 77-78. The hoped that the chance at parole 
would ensure that Mr. Hall would not suffer the same fate the next time he was released from 
custody. Tr. p. 79. However, the Court found that the issues of his treatment prior to sentencing 
were not proper for sentencing. 
THE COURT: The Court notes the defendant's briefing regarding the state of mental illness 
as - at this time as a public health problem, in essence. 
The Court notes that there is a great movement afoot by various states to make real changes 
in caring for the mentally ill, but this Court on this day and in this case is not the forum to 
resolve the state of treatment for the mentally mental illness. 
Tr. p. 78, L. 14-21. 
The defendant timely appealed from the District Court's judgment. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the conditions of a defendant's pre-sentencing confinement are a factor for 





The District Court erred in holding that conditions of pre-sentencing confinement are not a 
factor to be considered at sentencing even if they arise to the level of pretrial punishment in violation 
of Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
B. Standard of Review 
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. The standard of review of a sentence, as 
well as the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence, are well-
established. "Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a 
clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence." State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 
573, 577 (1979). In determining whether the sentencing court abused its discretion, an appellate 
court reviews all the facts and circumstances of the case. State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 143 
(1991). In order to show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show that in light of the 
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive, considering any view of the facts. Id. at 145. The 
governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: " '(l) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and ( 4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.'" Id. quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382,384 (1978). 
C. Conditions of a defendant's pre-conviction and pre-sentencing confinement are a factor to be 
considered at sentencing. 
The District Court had the discretion to impose a sentence between one and ten years. LC. § 
18-1401. However, LC.§ 19-2521 states: 
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The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without 
imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, 
it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public 
because: 
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or 
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or 
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided 
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or 
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime; 
or 
( d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the 
defendant; or 
( e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in 
the community; or 
(:t) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal. 
The District Court was also is aware of the sentencing factors in State v. Toohill, I 03 Idaho 565 
(Ct.App.1982). The Court of Appeals in Toohill held: 
We believe the ABA principle-that a term of confinement should not exceed the 
minimum necessary to accomplish sentencing objectives-can be integrated with Idaho 
sentencing policy. The resultant formulation adds meaning to the concept of 
"reasonableness." We hold that a term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it 
appears necessary, at the time of sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of 
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case. A sentence of confinement 
longer than necessary for these purposes is unreasonable. 
In matters involving the mentally ill, however, the Court of Appeals has held: 
We recognize, as did the district court, that Leach's crime was a product of her mental 
illness. Therefore, the sentencing goals of retribution and personal deterrence do 
not come into play, and it is likely that the goal of rehabilitation would be better 
accomplished by treatment outside the confines of a correctional facility. 
[ emphasis added] 
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State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 534 (2001). 
District Court recognized Mr. Hall's mental health issues. p. 78, L. 1-10. However, 
the Court determined that Mr. Hall's treatment prior to sentencing was not relevant to the sentence 
he received. Tr. p. 78, L. 11-21. 
Two authorities require a sentencing court to take presentence confinement into account at 
sentencing. First, pursuant to I. C. § 18-309, a defendant is to receive credit toward his sentencing for 
time he serves in the state's custody prior to sentencing. In this case, the District Court gave Mr. 
Hall two hundred and five (205) days of credit for presentence incarceration toward the sentence. 
Thus, the law requires a court to convert pretrial confinement into punishment. 
The second authority is the Too hill factors. The time a defendant serves prior to sentencing is 
considered part and parcel of the punishment aspect of a Court's sentence. See State v. Dana, 137 
Idaho 6, 8 (2002); State v. Tousignant, 123 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct.App.1992). 
The issue raised by Mr. Hall and rejected by the District Court is whether a sentencing court 
should consider conditions of confinement when imposing the sentence and treat conditions that rise 
to the level of pretrial punishment in violation of Due Process as a mitigating factor. In Mahaffey v. 
State, 87 Idaho 228,230,232 (1964), the Idaho Supreme Court, confronted with a petition in which a 
prisoner alleged beatings, denial of medical care, being held in solitary for long periods, being 
frustrated in his attempts to file for habeas corpus, held: 
if these facts are true, some are 'inexcusable and shocking.' There can be little doubt 
but what petitioner has alleged a prima facie case of cruel and unusual punishment. 
Most jurisdictions seem to adhere to the rule that while ordinarily courts will not 
interfere in prison affairs, an exception will be made in cases involving a prisoner's 
constitutional right to be secure from cruel and unusual punishment. 
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citing Hughes v. Turner, 378 P.2d 888 (Utah 1963); Harris v. Settle, 322 F.2d 908 (8th Cir., 1963); 
re Baptista's Petition, 206 F.Supp. 288 (W.D.Mo., 1962). · Application of Brux, 216 
F.Supp. 956 (D.C.Ha., 1963);/n re Riddle, 372 P.2d 304 (Cal. 1962); In re Jones, 372P.2d 310 (Cal. 
1962); Coffin v. Reichard, 142 F.2d 443 (6th Cir.1944); McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J.Super. 468, 
130 A.2d 881 (1957). When such conditions are present pretrial, they constitute a Due Process 
violation known as pretrial punishment. See lvlallery v. Lewis, 106 Idaho 227, 231, 235 (1983). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that unconstitutional conditions of confinement 
may allow courts to go "beyond the traditional remedy of release." Russell v. Fortney, 111 Idaho 
181, 183 (2014 ). At the same time, the Court of Appeals has held that conditions of confinement are 
"preferably addressed in post-conviction or habeas corpus proceedings." State v. Sherman, 120 Idaho 
464,466 (1991) citing State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Garza, 115 Idaho 
32 (Ct.App.1988). However, those cases involve a defendant complaining that the prison does not 
provide sufficient rehabilitative programming, not, as in this case, that they are being mentally 
harmed by the conditions of their confinement. See id Lack of rehabilitative programming could 
never been considered pretrial punishment in violation of Due Process, whereas months of solitary 
confinement for the mentally ill, as will be shown in the next section, can and are. 
However, no case law exists on the affect that pretrial punishment should have on a 
sentencing, save for the well-developed jurisprudence of the United States Military. While there is 
no obvious explanation for why the issue has never been raised outside the military, it is easy to see 
why the military has developed the issue so well- Article 13 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
states: 
Subject to section 857 of this title (article 57) [Effective date of sentences], no 
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person, while being held for trial or the result of trial, may be subjected to 
ptmishment or penalty other than arrest or confinement upon the charges pending 
against him, nor shall the arrest or confinement imposed upon him be any more 
rigorous than the circumstances require to insure his presence, but he may be 
subjected to minor punishment during that period for infractions of discipline. 
The Court of Military Appeals found that Article 13 puts the following squarely at issue: 
"Whether the circumstances of accused's pretrial confinement resulted in a denial of 
due process of law." 
US. v. Nelson, 39 C.M.R. 177, 178 (C.M.A. 1969). But Article 13 merely prohibits what the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution already prohibits, and so while perhaps giving a 
clear passage to cite to in briefing, its existence still does not explain by its existence the total lack of 
opinions on the topic of what constitutes pretrial punishment and how it should be viewed by courts 
at sentencing in state and federal criminal proceedings. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) 
("For under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt 
in accordance with due process of law"); Mallery 106 Idaho at 231,235. In view of the lack of 
authority on the issue, the military courts provide a good starting point for courts in Idaho to consider 
how Mr. Hall's confinement should have been treated at his sentencing. 
First, the Court of Military Appeals has construed the prohibition on pretrial punishment 
thus: 
From the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress, the framers of the 
Manuals for Courts-Martial, and the Army must have recognized that gross injustices 
might result from any confinement system in which one accused of crime was treated 
no better than one proved guilty. Therefore, to eliminate any and all forms of 
punishment prior to trial, except that which is inherent in all confinement, laws and 
regulations were enacted to protect the untried confinee. It must be remembered that 
the only valid ground for ordering confinement prior to trial is to insure the continued 
presence of the accused, as where he has earlier indicated that his obligation to 
remain with his unit weighs lightly with him, or where the seriousness of the offense 
alleged is likely to tempt him to take leave of his surroundings. 
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v. Bayhead, 21 C.M.R. 84, 90 (C.M.A. 1956); cf Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-540 (discussing proper 
inquiry into constitutionality of conditions of pretrial detention). 
on this concept in Nelson, 39 C.M.R. at 181-82 when it held: 
placed hea,ry emphasis 
Ordinarily the board of review is the appropriate tribunal for reassessment of 
sentences found faulty at this level. However, this accused has already served his 
sentence to confinement at hard labor, and the only unexecuted portion of the 
sentence is the punitive discharge. Under these circumstances, were we simply to 
return the case to the board of review for reassessment of the sentence, we would 
thereby imply that the bad-conduct discharge may be affirmed. Such a course would 
deprive the accused of all meaningful relief, and would rightly suggest that this 
Court is prepared to wink at such grossly illegal treatment of men in pretrial 
confinement. The disastrous effects of such a situation upon the system of 
military justice itself are so manifest as to require us to eliminate that 
possibility. [ emphasis added] 
Accordingly, the decision of the board of review as to sentence is reversed. The 
record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Nary. A board of 
review may reassess and approve a sentence which does not include a bad-conduct 
discharge. 
Military courts have approved various types of relief for pretrial punishment, from outright 
dismissal, as in Bayhead, to requiring the sentencing judge to consider it as a mitigating factor, as in 
US. v. Gettz, 49 C.M.R. 79, 83 (N.C.M.R. 1974). In U.S. v. Zarbatany, 70 M.J. 169 (C.A.A.F. 2011), 
the accused was in "virtual lockdown" status for a period of 119 days while in pretrial confinement. The 
accused was denied access to mental health counseling, despite repeated requests. The military judge 
ultimately awarded 4-for-1 credit, but noted that "the court is very tempted to provide ten-for-one credit 
solely on the mental health issue considering this installation's notice of the seriousness of the mental 
health issues." In Zarbatany, the 4-for-1 credit proved to be "meaningful relief' since the accused was 
only sentenced to confinement for six months (and thus, the confinement credit exceeded his sentence). 
See U.S. v. Zarbatany, 2012 WL 215865 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App.); See also U.S. v. Tilghman, 44 M.J. 493 
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(C.A.A.F. 1996) (awarding ten-for-one credit for illegal pretrial confinement in contravention of judge's 
The military also does not restrict its review to the conditions or requirements the 
government put in place. In US. v. Fulton, 55 M.J. 88, 90-91 (C.A.A.F. 2001), Chief Justice Crawford 
stated: 
A comi should not use its supervisory authority to impose extraordinary remedies to 
vindicate wrongs unless the person allegedly wronged has sought, and failed to obtain, 
reasonable, remedial relief through, e.g., command channels, either directly or under 
Article 138, UCMJ, 10 USC§ 938; the Inspector General's Office; or the Chaplaincy. If 
the command and staff offices have turned a blind eye toward an egregious situation, 
dismissal of court-martial changes would be warranted as an extraordinary measure. 
See, also, Zarbatany, 70 M.J. at 172 (finding illegal pretrial punishment where "specific complaints ... 
should have put the commander on notice that [the accused] was being illegally punished [but] he didn't 
care because he thought the punishment was appropriate for the crimes he had done - overcoming the 
accused's presumption of innocence."). 
These holdings are in accord with Supreme Court holdings on pretrial punishment allegations 
brought as habeas petitions. "The courts must determine whether the condition or restriction is 
imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate 
governmental purpose." Id. at 229. In Bell v. Wo?fish the U.S. Supreme Court identifies some useful 
guideposts in determining whether pretrial detainment amounts to a punishment, "[a] court must 
decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an 
incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose." 441 U.S.at 539. The Comi further 
expounded in Bell that, if there is no showing of express intent of punishment the "detennination 
generally will tum on whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appeaTS excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
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assigned to it." Id. Conditions of confinement can amount to cruel and unusual punishment when 
they deprive the prisoner of some of his basic human needs such as food, warmth or exercise. Wilson 
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991). And "contemporary standards of decency must be brought to 
bear in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual." Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1316 
(11th Cir. 1999). 
Thus, the decisions of the military courts as to the effect of cruel and unusual conditions that 
harm prisoners and constitute presentence punishment prior to sentencing should be persuasive in 
Idaho. While protection of society may be the utmost goal in sentencing, under the principles of 
fundamental fairness and equity held in high esteem by Idaho's judiciary, the Toohill factors, and LC. 
§ 19-2521, harmful conditions of confinement that qualify as pretrial punishment should be given the 
weight they deserve when a court is determining what more punishment, if any, a defendant requires. 
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1992); State v. Saviers, 156 
Idaho 324 (Ct.App.2014); State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 
460 (2002); Toohill, 103 at 568; US. v. Fulton, 55 M.J. at 90-91; US. v. Gettz, 49 C.M.R. at 83. 
Without taking into account the fact that a defendant was exposed to cruel and unusual punishment 
prior to sentencing, the Court cannot possibly determine the sentence which is "necessary," as it 
ignores the intensity of the retribution and deterrence imposed on the individual, the now greater 
need for rehabilitation, and the needs of society under all the circumstances. See Miller, 151 at 834. 
This Court should find that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that 
presentence punishment that rises to pretrial or cruel and unusual punishment should be a factor at 
sentencing. See State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592 (1999); State v. Adams, 99 Idaho 75, 85 
(1978). This Court should remand the matter for findings as to whether Mr. Hall endured cruel and 
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unusual punishment, and if so, to take that into account in crafting his sentence. 
The defendant provided the District Court with facts which if believed would have been a 
mitigating factor to be considered at sentencing. 
As noted above, in cases involving pretrial detention, in order to show a violation of the Due 
Process clause, a defendant must show that the restrictions placed upon him are "not reasonably related to 
a legitimate goal." Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. Unlike a convicted prisoner, a pretrial detainee's treatment is 
viewed objectively, with no inquiry into whether the government was motivated to punish him or had a 
deliberate disregard for the pretrial detainee' s welfare. Id. at 539-540; see, also, County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,849 (1998); Youngbergv. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,320 (1982). Thus, in Youngberg, 
the Court held restraints on the mentally ill could not be more than those deemed necessary by 
professionals in a mental hospital. 457 U.S. at 323-24. 
In this case, Mr. Hall spent months in solitary confinement due to mental illness. See, generally, 
Log; Manual, p. 45-52, 62-63. While the jail refers to the various conditions Mr. Hall was held in as 
administrative segregation, medical observation, a stripped cell, and as being under suicide watch 
(Manual, p. 45-52, 62-63), its actual components are what are commonly recognized as solitary 
confinement: 
Solitary confinement is the practice of placing a person alone in a cell for 22 to 24 
hours a day with little human contact or interaction; reduced or no natural light; 
restriction or denial of reading material, television, radios or other property; severe 
constraints on visitation; and the inability to participate in group activities, including 
eating with others. While some specific conditions of solitary confinement may differ 
among institutions, generally the prisoner spends 23 hours a day alone in a small cell 
with a solid steel door, a bunk, a toilet, and a sink. Human contact is restricted to 
brief interactions with corrections officers and, for some prisoners, occasional 
encounters with healthcare providers or attorneys. Family visits are limited; almost all 
human contact occurs while the prisoner is in restraints and behind a partition. Many 
prisoners are only allowed one visit per month, if any. The amount of time a person 
spends in solitary confinement varies, but can last for months, years, or even decades. 
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Solitary confinement goes by many names, whether it occurs in a supermax prison or 
in a unit within a regular prison. These units are often called disciplinary segregation, 
administrative segregation, control units, security housing units (SHU), special 
management units (SMU), or simply "the hole." Recognizing the definitional morass, 
the American Bar Association has created a general definition of solitary 
confinement, which it calls "segregated housing": 
The term "segregated housing" means housing of a prisoner in conditions 
characterized by substantial isolation from other prisoners, whether pursuant to 
disciplinary, administrative, or classification action. "Segregated housing" includes 
restriction of a prisoner to the prisoner's assigned living quarters. 
The term "long-term segregated housing" means segregated housing that is expected 
to extend or does extend for a period of time exceeding 30 days. 
In 2013, the Department of Justice employed a similar definition, noting that "the 
terms 'isolation' or 'solitary confinement' mean the state of being confined to one's 
cell for approximately 22 hours per day or more, alone or with other prisoners, ... 
[with] limit[ed] contact with others .... An isolation unit means a unit where all or 
most of those housed in the unit are subjected to isolation." 
ACLU, The Dangerous Overuse of Solitary Confinement in the United States (2014) (footnotes 
omitted) citing United States Department of Justice, Letter to the Honorable Tom Corbett, Re: 
Investigation of the State Correctional Institution at Cresson and Notice of Expanded Investigation, 
May 31, 2013, at p. 5 (emphasis m original), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/docurnents/cresson_findings_5-31-13.pdf (citing Wilkinson v. 
Austin, 545 U.S. 209,214,224 (2005), where the United States Supreme Court described solitary 
confinement as limiting human contact for 23 hours per day, and Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 
422 (3d Cir. 1990), where the Third Circuit described it as limiting contact for 21 to 22 hours per 
day)); ABA Crim. Just. Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, Standard 23-1.0(o), (r) (2010), 
available at http:/ /www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/midyear2010/102i.pdf; Eric Lanes, The 
Association of Administrative Segregation Placement and Other Risk Factors with the Self-Injury-
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Free Time of Male Prisoners, 48 J. OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION 529,532 (2009); Leena Kurki & 
Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and Problems of Supermax Prisons, 28 CRIME AND JUST. 
385, 389 (2001). 
Solitary has a long history in the United States. In 1890, the Supreme Court of the United 
States found: 
[Prisoners subject to solitary confinement] fell, after even a short confinement, into a 
semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and 
others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who 
stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover 
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community. 
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). A century later, this form of imprisonment, notably 
compared by most experts as having similar effects on humans as physical torture, and banned by 
most civilized nations, has exploded with popularity in the United States. See Jeffery L. Metzner & 
Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in US. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical 
Ethics, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 38:103, 104-106 (Aug. 2010); Jamie Fellner,A Corrections 
Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 391, 404-410 (2006). 
In response, most federal circuits and states who have dealt with the issue have found that 
placing the mentally ill in solitary is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution's ban on Cruel and Unusual punishment. See Indiana Protection & Advocacy Services 
Commission v. Commissioner, 2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. Ind., Dec. 31, 2012) (holding that the 
Indiana Department of Correction's practice of placing prisoners with serious mental illness in 
segregation constituted cruel and unusual treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Jones 
'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101-02 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction 
requiring the removal of prisoners with serious mental illness from "supermax" prison); Ruiz v. 
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Johnson, 37 Supp. 2d 855,915 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev 'don other grounds, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 
I), adhered to on remand, I Supp. 2d (S.D. 2001) ("Conditions in TDCJ-ID's 
administrative segregation units clearly violate constitutional standards when imposed on the 
subgroup of the plaintiffs' class made up of mentally-ill prisoners"); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. 
Supp. 1282, 1320-21 (E.D. Cal. 1995) ("defendants' present policies and practices with respect to 
housing of [prisoners with serious mental disorders] in administrative segregation and in segregated 
housing units violate the Eighth Amendment rights of class members"); lvfadrid v. Gomez, 889 F. 
Supp. 1146, 1265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding prisoners with mental illness or those at a high risk 
for suffering injury to mental health in "Security Housing Unit" is unconstitutional); Casey v. Lewis, 
834 F. Supp. 1477, 1549-50 (D. Ariz. 1993) (finding Eighth Amendment violation when "Despite 
their knowledge of the harm to seriously mentally ill inmates, ADOC routinely assigns or transfers 
seriously mentally ill inmates to [segregation units]"); Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522,540 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that evidence of prison officials' failure to screen out from SHU "those 
individuals who, by virtue of their mental condition, are likely to be severely and adversely affected 
by placement there" states an Eighth Amendment claim); TR. et al. v. S.C. Dept. of Corrections, 
CIA No. 2005-CP-40-2925 (S.C. Ct. Comm. Pleas 5th J. Cir. Jan. 8, 2014) (finding major 
deficiencies in the Department of Corrections' treatment of prisoners with mental illness, including 
solitary confinement, and ordering defendants to submit a remedial plan). See also Letter from 
Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div. & David J. 
Hickton, U.S. Att'y, U.S. Att'y's Office, W.D. Penn. to Tom Corbett, Gov. of Pennsylvania, Re: 
Investigation of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' Use of Solitary Confinement on 
Prisoners with Serious Mental Illness and/or Intellectual Disabilities (Feb. 24, 2014), available at 
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http:/ /www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/pdoc _finding_ 2-24-14.pdf (finding, after a system-
investigation, that state prisons across Pennsylvania "use[] solitary confinement in that 
violate the rights of prisoners with SMI/ID [serious mental illness and intellectual disabilities]," 
citing "conditions that are often unjustifiably harsh," and detailing a number of other Eighth 
Amendment violations stemming from the practice of holding prisoners with serious mental illness 
in solitary confinement); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
Civil Rights Div. to Tom Corbett, Gov. of Pennsylvania, Regarding the Investigation of the State 
Correctional Institution at Cresson (May 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/cresson _findings_ 5-31-13 .pdf; Response of the 
United States of America to Defendants' Motion in Limine No.4: To Exclude the Statement of 
Interest 2-5, Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD PC, Doc. No. 4919 (E.D. Cal. 
Nov. 12, 2013) (summarizing the United States government's position on the applicability of the 
Eighth Amendment to the placement of prisoners with serious mental illness in solitary confinement 
for prolonged periods of time). 
For example, the Ninth Circuit held that outdoor exercise is required when prisoners were 
otherwise confined in cells for almost twenty-four (24) hours a day. Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 
189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979). Solitary confinement is one of the harshest penalties that prisoners can 
endure. Berch v. Stahl, 373 F. Supp. 412,420 (W.D.N.C. 1974). Although solitary confinement is 
not per sea cruel and unusual punishment "solitary confinement for excessive durations is unlawful 
as offending the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution." Id. In fact the Berch court held that solitary 
confinement for more than fifteen (15) days with a solid door or thirty (30) days with a barred door, 
because of its severity, was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. 
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To prove an Eighth Amendment violation, prisoners must show that the government's 
~ ... -..,.,_.., intended their actions as punishment or at least that deliberately disregarded a known 
problem. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). For example, in Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 
F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2001), the petitioner had to prove that her son, a mentally ill inmate who had a 
history of mental illness and suicide attempts, had (1) recently lost nearly one-third of his body 
weight, (2) written letters to his mother contemplating his death, (3) written a last will and 
testament, (4) told guards that he planned to commit suicide, and (5) covered his cell openings 
with toilet paper so that it was difficult to see inside, so as simply to state a claim that guards 
were aware of a substantial risk that inmate would commit suicide. As argued above, Mr. Hall 
need not make this showing as a pretrial detainee to establish a Due Process violation. Thus, 
considering that he was subjected to treatment that would be deemed cruel and unusual, it should 
be clear that a Due Process violation can be proven. 
Additionally, the legislature ofldaho has also found that seclusion and restraints should not 
be used on the mentally ill except under certain circumstances: 
Restraints shall not be applied to a patient nor shall a patient be secluded unless it is 
determined that such restraint or seclusion is necessary for the patient's safety or for 
the safety of others. Every instance of a restraint or seclusion of a patient shall be 
documented in the clinical record of the patient. In addition, every instance of a 
restraint or seclusion shall be evaluated and the evaluation and reasons for such 
restraint or seclusion shall be made a part of the clinical record of the patient under 
the signature of a licensed physician or, as delegated through the bylaws of the 
hospital's medical or professional staff, other practitioners licensed to practice 
independently. Whenever a peace officer deems it necessary to apply restraints to a 
patient while transporting the patient from one (1) facility to another and that restraint 
is against the medical advice of a licensed physician, the officer shall document the 
use of restraints in a report to be included in the clinical record. 
LC. § 66-345. The fact that this law is intended for hospitals and not jails should not be seen as 
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some carte blanche for jails to do to the mentally ill what hospitals may not, but rather as an 
oversight; a mistake resulting from the fact that jails were never intended to house the mentally ill. 
See State v. Hargis, 126 Idaho 727, 731 (1995) (holding prejudgment detainees with mental health 
problems may be committed under Title 66 or Title 18 depending on the detainee's issue). As the 
Supreme Court held in Youngberg, the decision to restrain the mentally ill must be made by 
professionals: 
By "professional" decisionmaker, we mean a person competent, whether by 
education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long-term 
treatment decisions normally should be made by persons with degrees in medicine or 
nursing, or with appropriate training in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or 
the care and training of the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding 
care-including decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be 
made in many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject to 
the supervision of qualified persons. 
457 U.S. at 324 n. 30. The jail had no one with the requisite formal education making the decision to 
place Mr. Hall into solitary. The decision was made by guards on the basis of policies adopted by 
law enforcement. 
Therefore, it is clear that the District Court was aware of facts which, if believed, would have 
shown that Mr. Hall had been exposed to presentence conditions of confinement that are in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and thus certainly a violation of his Due 
Process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and Art. I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The District Court in this case found that Mr. Hall was mentally ill. Tr. p. 77-78. It further 
recognized that illness' impact on his life. Tr. p. 78 L. 1-10. However, the District Court did not 
make any findings as to whether Mr. Hall had been exposed to long periods of seclusions, restraints, 
and improper mental health treatment. Tr. p. 78, L. 11-21. The District Court did not make these 
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findings because the District Court did not believe these facts, if found by the District Court, should 
the sentence. Id. The Court did not find that solitary confinement for the mentally ill is not 
pretrial punishment in violation of Due Process. See id. If the Court had, such a conclusion would 
have been in error. For the purposes of this appeal, however, it if sufficient to note that the error in 
not recognizing the significance of Mr. Hall's conditions of confinement on his sentence that 
occurred was not harmless, because if the District Court had recognized that presentence conditions 
of confinement could affect the sentence, they most certainly would have in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, this Court is asked to reverse the judgment of the District Court 
and remand for a new sentencing that will take into account the state's treatment of Mr. Hall's during 
his pretrial incarceration. 
DATED this ;)_ 6 day of April, 2015. 
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